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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW-SCOPE OF REvIEw: REVIEw COURT MAY NOT
ExAMINE THE WISDOM OF LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD DECISION, BUT MAY
DETERMINE WHETHER FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS

HAVE BEEN VIOLATED

-Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wn.2d 445,
495 P.2d 657 (1972).
Defendant, the Seattle School Board, attempted to implement a
plan to desegregate the Seattle school system. The plan included the
restructuring of school grade classifications in accordance with a
"middle school" concept,' and mandatory reassignment of approximately 850 black and white sixth, seventh and eighth grade children
from their "neighborhood schools"'2 to schools in other areas of the
city. Mandatory bussing was not required, but bus transportation was
to be available for those students who desired it. Plaintiffs, Citizens
Against Mandatory Bussing (CAMB), obtained an injunction restraining implementation of the plan for one year. The basis for the
injunction was that, although the school board did not lack the authority to adopt the plan, it had nevertheless "'made a mistake,' an
unwise policy decision."'3 The trial court also found that the board's
alleged "hasty" consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the mandatory reassignment plan, as well as
its alleged failure to fully examine and consider possible alternative
4
plans, amounted to "arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious" conduct.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision and
dissolved the injunction. Held: In reviewing a non-judicial decision of a
local school board, made within the Board's lawful scope of discretion,
a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board, and may
set aside the Board's decision only if it resulted from unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious action, or is violative of a "fundamental right."

1.

The "middle school" concept would, in effect, eliminate the traditional junior

high school (7th, 8th and 9th grades). A "middle school" is a grouping of the 5th, 6th, 7th
and 8th grades, after which students would enter a four-year high school course. By itself, the "middle school" concept has no racial connotations, but a gradual implementa-

tion of such schools was adopted by the Seattle School Board as a means of facilitating
racial desegregation in Seattle schools.
2. A "neighborhood school" is one which serves students living within definable
boundaries surrounding an area contiguous to a particular school. In many cases, the
school attended by a particular student would be the one which was closest to his home.
Historically, the Seattle school system has adhered to the neighborhood school concept.
3. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wn.2d 445, 448, 495 P.2d

657, 660 (1972).
4. Id. at 447, 495 P.2d at 659.
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Parents do not have a fundamental right to either the preservation of
the neighborhood school system of pupil assignment or to the selection
of a particular public school which their children shall attend. Citizens
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wn. 2d 445, 495 P.2d
657 (1972).
The genesis of the Palmason dispute goes back several years. The
Seattle School Board, recognizing the deterioration of racial integration in the Seattle school system,5 began formulating and evaluating
plans to desegregate Seattle schools. In 1963, the board initiated a
voluntary reassignment plan, which allowed students to transfer out6
side of neighborhood school boundaries under certain circumstances.
By 1967, however, it had become apparent that the voluntary transfer
program alone would not overcome racial imbalance in Seattle
schools. 7 In 1968, the Board adopted several additional proposals,
including a planned conversion of several junior high schools to
"middle schools," 8 and a plan specifically directed at racial imbalance
in Seattle's Central Area.9 Implementation of a broadly based desegregation plan took on a new urgency, however, following a federal suit
against the School Board by a group of Central Area parents seeking

5. Brief of Appellants, at 5-8, Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80
Wn. 2d 445, 495 P.2d 657 (1972). Copious data was presented at the trial by the school
board which documented the increasing trend toward racial segregation in the Seattle
school system over the past several years, due primarily to the influence of defacto segregation in housing. For example, in the 1970-71 school year, 80% of the regularly
enrolled students of the Seattle School District were white, 12.8% were black and
7.2% were of Oriental and Indian extraction. But 40.5% of the black students attended
school in the Central Area of Seattle, whereas the North Region accounted for only
16.7% of Seattle's black students (of these over 80% were transferees from the Central
Area). Two Seattle high schools (Franklin and Garfield) had over 50% non-white
student enrollment, and a number of elementary schools had over 60% non-white
student composition. One elementary school, Coleman, was 94.5% non-white.
In 1964 only thirteen Seattle schools had a single minority enrollment of more than
25%. By 1971, this number had risen to include 25 schools. Garfield High School, for
example, changed from 52.1% black enrollment in 1964 to 79.6% in 1971. and Meany
junior high changed from 49.2% black to 68.5% black during the same period.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 10. Under this plan, one or more junior high schools would become racially
balanced by September, 1969, and a total of at least three by September 1971. A citizen's committee was appointed to recommend detailed plans.
9. Id. This plan, called the "Educational Plan for the Central District," was implemented in 1970. Under this plan, the region has developed eight "satellite" preschool
units serving three and four year olds, a K-2 (Kindergarten through second grade) Early
Childhood Education Center, seven K-4 primary schools, two K-6 schools, one middle
school and one high school. This plan did not include mandatory bussing of students
outside of the Central Area.
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to compel the total desegregation of all Seattle schools. 10 In October
of 1970, the board held public meetings for the purpose of obtaining
public input regarding school desegregation" and shortly thereafter
adopted the "middle school" mandatory reassignment plan which
became the focal point of the CAMB opposition.
Palmason presents a classic confrontation between the free exercise
of administrative discretion and the necessity of independent controls
to prevent abuse of such discretion. Determining the permissible scope
of judicial interference, however, can be a perilous task. This is particularly true when the issue involved is as highly controversial and as
emotionally charged as mandatory reassignment and the permissible
scope of review is as unpredictable as in Washington.' 2 The Palmason

court found it necessary to go through four distinct steps, with each
step presenting unique and yet interdependent issues, in resolving the
legality of the Board's action.
First, the court examined the statutory boundaries of the School
Board's authority to determine whether the action taken was properly
within the Board's discretion. Citing State ex rel. Citizens Against
Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks,13 decided just three months prior to
Palmason, the court decided that the action was within the Board's
power. In Brooks, the court had concluded that the Seattle School

10. Campbell v. Seattle School District No. 1, Civil NO. 9171 (W.D. Wash., filed
August 28, 1970).
I1. Public hearings were held on October 28, 29, and 30 and November 2, 5 and 6,
1970. The school board was not required by law to hold public hearings, because it is
not subject to the Washington Administrative Procedures Act, which covers only state
agencies (as opposed to local agencies, such as the Seattle School Board). See WASH. REv.
CODE Ch. 34.04 (1967).

12. Depending upon the particular agency under review, and the nature of the action taken by the agency, the scope ofjudicial review in Washington can range from no
review at all to trial de novo. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sater v. Board of Pilotage Com'rs
of Washington, 198 Wash. 695, 90 P.2d 238 (1939) (in general, discretionary powers of
an agency not subject to review); Jow Sin Quan v. Washington State Liquor Control
Bd., 69 Wn.2d 373, 418 P.2d 424 (1966) (broad spectrum of review available); WASH.
REV. CODE § 18.64.200 (1963) (trial "de novo" and "as an ordinary civil action" in review
of revocation of pharmacist's license).
The Palmason action was brought under the authority of WASH. REV. CODE Ch.

28A.88 (1969), which provides for a review de novo of decisions or orders of any
school official. The Washington court, however, has held that where a power exercised by
a state agency is essentially administrative, judicial review will be limited to a consideration of whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law, even
though the statute authorizes a review de novo in the superior court. In re Harmon, 52
Wn.2d 118, 323 P.2d 653 (1958). See generally Peck, The Scope of Jndicial Review of
Administrative Action in Washington, 33 WASH. L. REV. 55 (1958).
13. 80 Wn.2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
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Board's adoption of the "middle school" mandatory reassignment plan
14
was a lawful exercise of discretion vested in the Board by statute.
The second step in the court's analysis was to determine whether
the action taken by the Board was primarily adjudicative or legislative, a categorization the court believed was necessary before it could
define the proper scope of judicial review. A court's primary task in
reviewing legislative action is the determination of whether the agency
has exceeded the power or standards delegated to it by the legislature.
However, review of judicial action extends to such areas as statutory
construction, determining whether the agency has complied with the
procedural requirements of due process, and deciding whether agency
findings are supported by the evidence. 15 The Palmason court concluded that under any test the action of the school directors in this
16
case was non-judicial.
On the basis of this determination, the court proceeded to take the
17
third step, the application of the traditional "unreasonableness" test,
and concluded that the action of the Board was neither unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious nor illegal. It is a well established administrative
law principle in Washington that once reviewability has been established, a court can, as a minimum, examine the administrative action
to determine if it was arrived at in an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or illegal manner.1 8 In making this determination, however, the
reviewing court must be careful to avoid scrutinizing or making judg14. The Brooks court quoted the following from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. I (1971):
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and
implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order
to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as
a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary
powers of school authorities ....

Although the Sivann case involved dejure segregation, as compared to the defacto segregation existent in Seattle, the Brooks court concluded that mandatory bussing was
within the discretionary powers of the school board, regardless of the nature of the segregation involved.
15.

2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 669 (1965).

16. Painason, 80 Wn.2d at 448 n.3, 495 P.2d at 659. Generally, if the function performed by the agency is one which courts have traditionally performed, and which the
courts could have performed in the first instance, it is a judicial function. In re Harmon,
52 Wn.2d 118, 323 P.2d 653 (1958).
17. See, e.g., Reagles v. Simpson, 72 Wn.2d 577, 434 P.2d 559 (1967); State ex rel.
Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635 (1965); 41 WAsH. L. REV. 517
(1966); 38 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1963). The "unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious" test
is also included as one of several permissible scope of review tests under the Washington Administrative Procedures Act, WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 34.04 (1967).
18. See note 17, supra.
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ments upon the wisdom or inherent policy considerations behind such
administrative decisions. 19 Judicial review of the wisdom of administrative action usurps the legislative prerogative of lawfully vested
agency discretion, and as such violates the separation of powers doctrine. 20 It was clear to the court in Palmasonthat the trial court had
improperly encroached upon the legislative function when it concluded that the school board had simply "made a mistake" in deciding
to implement its desegregation plan. The court found that the order
based upon this conclusion amounted to "nothing less than a substitution of the trial court's discretion for that of the school board, the
body authorized by law to make the particular decision in question
and to decide how and when to implement it."21
The Palmason decision also suggests several other respects in which
the trial court exceeded the permissible scope of review. For example,
the trial court found that the action of the School Board was "unreasonable and arbitrary" primarily upon the basis that the Board allegedly failed to fully consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances
and failed to provide plaintiffs and the general public sufficient opportunity to be heard on the issue. Yet the evidence indicated that the
School Board had conducted an exhaustive series of studies stretching
back at least seven years, 22 and that a number of public meeting were
19. In Palmason, the court quoted from State ex rel. Lukens v. Spokane School
Dist. No. 81, 147 Wash. 467, 474, 266 P. 189 (1928) as follows:

In a nut shell, this whole controversy arises over a question ofjudgment. The petitioners before the board ...are not in agreement with the members of the board.
That disagreement of itself is not for the courts. The law has plainly vested the
board of directors of school districts such as this with discretionary powers in such
matters, and the directors having examined into and passed upon the matter in the
exercise of their discretion, the courts have no right or power to review the conclu-

sions reached by them as a board in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion
on their part ....
There are numerous other examples of the Washington Supreme Court forbidding review of administrative wisdom. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Washington

Utilities and Transp. Comm., 69 Wn.2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966); Town of Steilacoom
v. Thompson, 69 Wn.2d 705, 419 P.2d 1046 (1957). A few cases indicate narrow exceptions to this general rule. See e.g., Tungent v. State Employment Security Dept., 2
Wn. App. 574, 468 P.2d 734 (1970).
20. While it is impossible to draw precise and inviolate lines between the functions

of each branch of government, it is generally recognized that constitutional restraints
are overstepped where one department of government attempts to usurp powers exclu-

sively delegated to another. State v. Fabbri, 98 Wash. 207, 213, 167 P. 133, 136
(1917). Thus, the separation of powers doctrine acts to maintain the overall integrity

of exclusive governmental authority.
21.

Palinason,80 Wn.2d at 451,459 P.2d at 661.

22. Id. at 451 n.7, 495 P.2d at 662, n.7. Twenty-six different proposals were studied
by the school board prior to implementation of the current plan.
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held, although by law the School Board was not required to hold
public hearings at all. 23 In addition, the trial court applied the "clearly
erroneous" test from the Washington Administrative Procedures Act,
even though it was conceded by both sides that the School Board was
not subject to the APA because it is not a state agency. Although the
Palmason court did not reach this issue, it seems that the striking incompatibility of the "clearly erroneous" test with the Washington Supreme Court's definition of "arbitrary and capricious" would have
24
amounted to still another ground for reversal in this case.
The Palmason court held that a fourth step in its analysis of the
scope of review of nonjudicial administrative decisions is that they
"can be examined to determine whether they violate some fundamental right of the party challenging them. '2 5 It is the express application of the fundamental right test, a concept which appears in only
a few Washington cases, 26 which sets the Palmason decision apart
from most Washington administrative law decisions.
23. See note 11, supra.
24. In Palmason, the trial court should have applied the "unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious" scope of review exclusively. See note 12, supra. The court has defined
"arbitrary and capricious" administrative action as:
...wilful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts
or circumstances... [but] where there is room for two opinions, action of an
administrative agency is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and
upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.
State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. No. 99 v. Bruno, 61 Wn.2d 461, 464, 378
P.2d 691, 693 (1962). Although administrative law "scope of review" tests often tend to
overlap due to varying judicial interpretations, it is nevertheless clear that in general the
"clearly erroneous" test gives a court a wider scope of review than does the "unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious" test. Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wn.2d 461, 294 P.2d 921
(1956); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955); Deaconess Hospital v.
Washington State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn.2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965); K. DAVIS,
AMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 29.02 (3d ed. 1972).
25. Palmason, 80 Wn.2d at 448, 449, 495 P.2d at 659.
26. The only other case in which the court has specifically referred to the "fundamental right" test of scope of review is State ex rel. DuPont-Fort Lewis School Dist. No.
7 v. Bruno, 62 Wn.2d 790, 384 P.2d 608 (1963). The court in DuPont postulated the validity and applicability of the "fundamental right" test upon its earlier decision in State
ex rel. Cosmopolis School Dist. No. 99 v. Bruno, 59 Wn.2d 366, 367 P.2d 599 (1962).
Cosinopolis, however, is weak support for the test, and is more readily explainable in
terms of an inherent constitutional right to judicial review of alleged illegal action of a
school board. Furthermore, although the court in Cosmnopoli.s struck down the schoolboard decision in question, it did not indicate that any "fundamental right" of the plaintiffs had been violated.
Several other Washington cases refer only tangentially to the "fundamental right"
scope of review, for example: Manlowe Transfer & Distributing Co. v. Department of
Public Service, 18 Wn.2d 754, 140 P.2d 287 (1943) (court can review agency decision
for "evidence of arbitrariness and disregard of the material rights of the parties...").
Accord, Floe v. Cedargreen Grozen Packing Corp., 37 Wn.2d 886, 226 P.2d 871 (1951).
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The rationale supporting the fundamental right test is somewhat
obscure. Washington precedent indicates that one function of the test
is to provide for judicial review of administrative action, based upon
authority inherent in the state constitution, where no statutory review
is available. 27 There is also evidence that the test performs the antithetic function of preventing interference with the exercise of adminis28
trative "police power" based upon frivolous or insubstantial rights.
Still another case, State ex rel. DuPont-FortLewis School DistrictNo.
7 v. Bruno, suggests the possibility that a court can review the wisdom
of an administrative decision if a "fundamental right" has been violated. 2 9 Since judicial review in Palmason was specifically authorized
by statute, 30 however, it is probable that the fundamental right test in
this instance was meant to delineate a sort of absolute "outer boundary"
of administrative discretion, a protected area into which even reasonable administrative action may not intrude. In this respect, the fundamental right test applied in Palmason transgresses previous appli31
cations of the test.
The Palmason court did not attempt to define "fundamental right."
27. State ex rel. Cosmopolis, School District No. 99 v. Bruno, 59 Wn.2d 366, 367
P.2d 599 (1962). The Washington Administrative Procedures Act contains a somewhat
analogous provision giving the review court authority to reverse an agency decision if
the "substantial rights" of the petitioners have been prejudiced because the decision was
"in violation of constitutional provisions." WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.030 (1967). Although this APA provision supports the "inherent power of review" concept of Cosmopolis, the APA test as applied appears to differ somewhat from the "fundamental right"
test of Palmason. For example, applications of the APA test have emphasized specific
constitutional requirements such as due process, equal protection, etc., whereas the
Palmasoncourt emphasized the nature of the specific right asserted, i.e., whether it was a
constitutionally protected right, or a vested property right. See 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 683 (1965).
28. Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church of Seattle v. Board of Regents, 72 Wn.2d
912, 436 P.2d 189 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1968).
29. State ex rel DuPont-Fort Lewis School Dist. No. 7 v. Bruno, 62 Wn.2d 790,
384 P.2d 608 (1963). DuPont was interpreted by the Palmason court as follows:
"In that case we held that a school district has no substantive right to accreditation
upon meeting certain standards and that, consequently, the propriety of an order of
the state superintendent denying accreditation... was not subject to review." 80 Wn.2d
at 449, 495 P.2d at 659 (emphasis added).
30. See note 12, supra.
31. The court has indicated that the "essential touchstone" of the fundamental right
test is the "basic nature and extent or magnitude of the right involved coupled with the
patency and character of the alleged violation." DuPont, 62 Wn.2d at 794, 384 P.2d at
610 (1963). In Pahnason, however, the court appears to have dispensed with the latter
qualification, i.e., the patency of the alleged violation, because although it found that the
action of the school board was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or illegal, it nevertheless examined the rights asserted to determine if they met the requisite fundamentality.
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Past cases, however, suggest certain parameters, primarily in the sense
that they indicate that which is not a "fundamental right." For example, the court has found that a school district has no fundamental
right to accreditation upon satisfaction of minimum statutory requirements,3 2 that parents have no such right in maintaining a school
building at a particular location, 33 and that a dentist has no vested
34
right to a license to practice dentistry once a license has been granted.
Similarly, the court has stated that there is no vested right to receive
welfare benefits, 35 or to be released early from prison due to credits
37
for good behavior, 3 6 to have property assessed in any particular way,
38
or to be employed or rehired by a public agency.
The supreme court found none of the rights asserted by CAMB to
be fundamental. The right most vigorously asserted was the right of
a parent to send his child to a neighborhood school. The respondents contended that the origin of the right stemmed from the ancient
tradition of the neighborhood school concept, and that parents' continued reliance upon this school policy - for example, buying a home
with specific reference to a particular school-had transformed the
right into a vested property right.39 Consequently, respondents
argued, it was an abuse of discretion for the school board to summarily
deprive them of this right. The Palmason court acknowledged only
a defeasible right, voluntarily granted by school authorities, that
could be taken away by school authorities. 40 The court also emphasized the fundamental principles that no one can have a vested right in
32. DuPont, 62 Wn.2d at 794, 384 P.2d at 610.
33. State ex rel. Lukens v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 147 Wash. 467, 266 P. 189
(1928).
34. In re Harmon, 52 Wn.2d 118, 323 P.2d 653 (1958).
35. Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social Services, 38 Wn.2d 142, 228
P.2d 478 (1951).
36. Butler v. Cranor, 38 Wn.2d 471, 230 P.2d 306(1951).
37. Northwest Commercial Co. v. King County, 63 Wn.2d 639, 388 P.2d 546
(1964).
38. State ex rel. Ford v. King County, 47 Wn.2d 911, 290 P.2d 465 (1955).
39. Although there is no case authority in support of a fundamental or proprietary
"right" to attend a neighborhood school, there is considerable authority which indicates
that the neighborhood school concept may be altered or eliminated to achieve school
desegregation. See, e.g., Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, Va., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.
1968); Taylor v. Board of Educ. of the City of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
40. This "right" as delineated by the Pahnason court appears to be a "transient"
equal protection right attaching to the then uniform neighborhood school policy of the
school board. When the policy is altered, the "right" is also subject to alteration. or extinguishment.
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any general rule of law or policy of legislation which entitles him to
insist that it remain unchanged for his benefit, 41 and that no one has
a vested right to be protected against consequential injury arising from
42
a proper exercise of rights by others.
The respondent's other main contention was that the assignment of
students to schools outside of their immediate neighborhood is an
improper interference with parental liberty to direct the education of
their children, implying that parents have a right to select the particular public school which their children shall attend. In support of this
contention, the respondents cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters,43 a landmark United States Supreme Court decision which held that an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools
constituted an unreasonable interference with inherent parental liberty
to direct the upbringing and education of their children. In response,
the Palmason court again found only a limited right. The court stated
that a parent is free to send his child to a qualified private school, but
that if he chooses to utilize the public school system, he must abide by
the reasonable rules and regulations of public school authorities. 44 In
this case, the court held the School Board's decision to implement its
racial desegregation plan was a "reasonable regulation." Those persons affected by it are required to comply unless they can show to the
Board's satisfaction some reason why they should be excused.
Confronted with an issue with such controversial ramifications, it is
perhaps understandable that a trial court could not resist the temptation to explore beyond the comparatively simple administrative law

41.

In support, the court cited State ex rel. Washington State Sportsmen's Council,

Inc..v. Coe, 49 Wn.2d 849, 307 P.2d 279 (1957), and Overlake Homes, Inc. v. Seattle-

First Nat'l. Bank, 57 Wn.2d 881, 360 P.2d 570 (1961).
42. The court emphasized that this rule is particularly applicable to injuries resulting from the exercise of public powers. See Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. Schaaf, I
Wn.2d 210, 395 P.2d 781 (1939); 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 795 (8th

ed. 1927).
In Pahnason, the court applied the rule with apparent reference to alleged ill effects
which would be suffered by some students compelled to participate in the mandatory
reassignment program, e.g., mental trauma, extra time spent on the bus, interference
with extracurricular activities, etc. In another part of its decision, the Pahnason court
held that the school board was not required to find such alleged adverse effects control-

ling, but were under a duty to act in the best interests of the majority of students.

43. 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
44. The court also cited Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86 P. 642 (1906). This
case held that a school board has the power to withdraw all privileges (from cheerleading
through graduation) from students, except for the statutory rights to attend high school
classes in order to induce those students to disband their high school Greek societies.
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issues presented in the Palmason dispute. The trial court in this instance was distracted from review of alleged "unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious" action by the School Board long enough to allow its
personal estimate of the inherent wisdom of the mandatory reassignment plan to show through. It is clear that the trial court issued an injunction based at least partially on this impermissible transgression.
Palmason re-emphasizes the continued viability of the separation of
powers doctrine in judicial review of discretionary administrative
conduct. Although the court has left some doubt as to the nature and
applicability of the "fundamental right" test, 45 it has left no doubt as
to the judicial protection of the freedom of a school board to act according to the law, and according to its conscience.
45. It would seem probable, however, that the Washington court would accept as
"fundamental" certain rights determined by the United States Supreme Court to be
"fundamental" under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson.
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel from state to state); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (first amendment freedoms).
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